We specifv and estimate an equilibrium job search model with pro-" ductivitv differences across labor market segments. The model allows for two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search frictions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist because of high unemplovment benefits or binding minimum wages. The . productivitv distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the lines of Gailant-Nvchka, using Hermite series approximation. We decompose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effect of changes in the minimum wage.
Introduction
Most studies on the impact of minimum wages on employment and wages exploit the fact that minimum wages vary over time or across labor market segments.' As an alternative, Meyer and Wise (1983a,b) propose a method in which the employment effect of minimum wages can be inferred using data on the crosssectional distribution of wages only, and without any variation in minimum wages at all. This method rests upon two assumptions. First, in the absence of a mandatorv minimum wage, the wage earnings distribution of individual workers follows has a functional form that is recoverable (see Flinn and Heckman (1982) ). This means that the distribution belongs to a family of distributions that is not closed under truncation. Thus the untruncated distribution can be fully identified its truncated version (for example, the lognormal distribution belongs to this family of distributions). Second, above a certain level (close to the minimum wage) the wage earnings distribution is unaffected by the imposition of a minimum wage. With these two assumptions it is possible to deduce the number of workers who should be earning a wage at or below the minimum from the estimated truncated wage earnings distribution.
The Mever and Wise technique has been used by e.g. AlbEk and Madsen (1987) and 'Van Soest (1989) . Obviously, the fundamental drawback is that the estimated effect of the minimum wage is sensitive to functional form assumptions on the distribution of wage earnings. In particular, the probability mass below the minimum wage is obtained by extrapolation of a distribution to a region where there are no observations, and alternative assumptions on the distribution of wages can result in different estimates of the effect of (changes in) minimum wages. 2 In contrast to this, Koning, , Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) present a model in which the effect of minimum wages can be identified without making untestable distributional assumptions. They specify and estimate an equilibrium search model which allows for two types of unemployment: unemployment due to search frictions (frictional unemployment) and unemployment due to minimum wages (structural unemployment). This is an interesting distinction, as it allows one to infer the group of individuals that also would be unemployed in the absence of minimum wages. Due to the structural setup of the model, it is possible to identifv the rate of structural unemplovment with data on (censored) unemri " plovment durations and/or the fraction of unemployment. In addition? the rate of structural unemployment is also equal to the probability mass of the individual 'See Card and Krueger (1995) and Dolado et al. (1996) for recent surveys of the literature. 'See Dickens Machin and Manning (1994) for an evaluation of the Meyer and Wise approach. f 2 productivity distribution below the minimum wage. This can be used as a check on the specification of the productivitv distribution. b In this paper we relax the distributional assumptions made by Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) with respect to the productivity distribution of individual workers. For this we follow the so called 'semi-nonparametric' (SNP) estimation method developed by Gallant and Nvchka (1987) . The basic idea of this estimation method is that any proper density can be approximated by a Hermite series. Within the context of the model, the advantages of the SNP approach are twofold. First, it allows us to estimate the truncated productivity density more accurately, resulting in better estimates of e.g. the elasticity of the rate of structural unemployment with respect to the minimum wage. Second, it reduces the impact of misspecification of the productivity distribution on the implied rate of structural unemployment. This rate is overidentified, and a more flexible functional form may help us reducing the biasing impact of this on the parameter estimates of the model.
The organization of this paper will be as follows. Section 2 discusses the Burdett-Mortensen model and the extension to heterogeneous agents. Section 3 describes the data we use in the empirical analysis, and the likelihood function is derived in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the identification of the model, as well as the SNP estimation method. In Section 6 we conduct two simulation experiments in order to test for the accuracv of the SNP method, as well as to examine the d impact of misspecification on the parameter estimates of the model. In Section 7 we present the estimation results of the equilibrium search model. Section 8 concludes. Most of the exposition in Sections 2, 3 and 4 will be kept brief, as the same material is discussed more extensively in Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) .
2 The equilibrium search model
Equilibrium search with identical agents
Consider a labor market with identical agents, i.e. a market in which all workers are equally productive at all firms. Even in this case, the Burdett-Mortensen model has a dispersed equilibrium wage (offer) distribution, i.e. the law of one price does not hold. Allowing for heterogeneitv in the productivity of workers adds " t,o the equilibrium dispersion of wages, and it allows us to distinguish between frictional and structural unemplovment.
We assume t,hat there are large fixed numbers of workers and firms participat-ing in the labor market (formally a continuum of each). The measure of workers is denoted by m., whereas the measure of firms is normalized to one. Workers receive job offers at given Poisson rates, A0 when unemployed and X, when employed, with 0 < A,, Al < -00. Job offers are independent random drawings from the distribution F(w) of wage offers. When an offer arrives, the worker must decide whether to accept the offer or to reject it and continue searching for a. better one. Workers become unemployed at the exogenous separation rate S (0 < 6 < oo). During unemployment, the worker receives unemplovment benefits b (0 < b < oo). A -firm posts a wage that is the same for all workers, and it does not bargain over this wage. In the basic model, the marginal value product of any worker at any firm is the same. It is denoted by p. The firms have a linear production function, so that the average and marginal product are equal. Individuals and firms are assumed to maximize their expected wealth.
Assuming that the wage offer distribution is known and stationary over time and that wages are constant in jobs, the supply-side of this model is equivalent to the standard job search model with search on the job (see e.g. Mortensen (1986) . Thus, the optimal strategy of an unemployed worker has the reservation wage property. The reservation wage T is r = b + (A, -w4 xl) r 6 + A,F(w)dw . with F = 1 -F. Employed workers accept any wage offer that exceeds their current wage.
It is important to distinguish between the distribution of wages offered to individuals, which is the wage offer distribution F, and the distribution of wages received bv workers who are currently employed. The latter is referred to as the d earnings distribution, and we denote this distribution by G. In equilibrium, the flow of workers out of jobs with a given wage is equal to the inflow in such jobs. Similarly, the flows into and out' of unemployment1 are equal. Firms that offer a wage lower than the reservation wage of the unemploved do not attract " any worker and t,herefore cannot survive. The market is only viable if there is a positive gain from trade, i.e. if p > b. Under these assumptions we have
In (4), u is the measure of unemployed workers. Thus, u/m is the rate of frictional unemployment in this market. It is determined by the rates 6 and A,. Note that with full information on the location of jobs, i.e. in the absence of search frictions, X, = 00 and u = 0. Frictional unemployment should be distinguished from structural unemployment, which occurs if the unemployment benefits, or more generally the value of leisure, exceeds the value product p. This type of structural unemployment is voluntary, because workers are better off if they are unemployed.
If there is a mandatory minimum wage, denoted by wL, then wage offers must exceed this Iwage. If p < wL, then firms do not employ any worker, and there is structural unemployment. This type of unemployment is involuntary if b < p < wL, because workers would supply labor if the minimum wage would be lower than p. Hence, if p > max(wL, b) then there is frictional unemployment equal to u, while if the reverse holds there is voluntary or involuntary structural unemplovment equal to m.
For the moment, assume that p > max(wL: b). The steady-state level of production is determined by the size of the steadv-state work force 1 of the firm.
. , That work force depends on the wage w set by the firm, the reservation wage r of the unemployed, and the distribution F of wages set by other firms competing for the same workers. Each firm chooses w to maximize its steady-state profit flow X, which, given T and F, equals (p -w)l(w; r, F) .
A noncooperative steadv-state equilibrium solution consists of a reservation wage T and a wage offer distribution F such that (i) T satisfies (1) given F. , ;ind (ii) everv w in the support of F maximizes the steady-state profit flow 7c Burdett and Mortensen (1998) prove t,hat there is a unique equilibrium and they give closed-form solutions. The distributions F and G have probabilitv density " functions f and y . with a support equal to [u, a] 
If r '< wL, the equilibrium reservation wage is not given by (8). However in that case the reservation wage is not effective, because the lowest wage offer is 7~~. If r > wL then r and w are weighted averages of b and p. Otherwise w is a -weighted average of p and wt. Note that r is smaller than b iff A0 is smaller than Xi. In that case the unemploved accept wages below b, because it is easier to find d a higher paying job if employed. Allowing for this possibility is important given the empirical evidence on the relative size of b and r (see e.g. Narendranathan and Nickel1 (1985) and Van den Berg (1990) ).
Using (2)) the equilibrium wage (or earnings) density is
On
Note that both f and g are increasing densities. The wage distribution is related to the income distribution, and there is abundant empirical evidence that the income distribution does not have an increasing density. We return to this issue below. For an employed individual earning a wage w, the exit rate out of that job equals S + AiF( This rate decreases in w, which is consistent with a number of empirical studies on job durations (Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991) and Van den Berg (1992) ).
Heterogeneity in value products
In reality workers and firms are obviously not identical. d4ll parameters of the model. ire. X,, X, , 6, b and p vary over workers and/or firms. ,4s argued in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998): t.here are basically two ways to introduce heterogeneitv: within the market and between markets. Heterogeneity within the market " means that there is one labor market within which heterogeneous workers and firms interact. Heterogeneitv between markets means that the labor market is segmented and consists of a large number of separate submarkets within which workers and firms are homogeneous. We follow the latter approach, and we assume that we observe a mixture of homogeneous markets. Conceivably we can stratify on all the parameters. In the present context, dispersion in p is particularly relevant, since it allows for the possibility of structural unemployment (namely when p < max(wL, b)). Because we assume that p follows a continuous distribution, we have effectively a continuum of submarkets which differ in the value product of workers.
As noted above, there is abundant empirical evidence that the income distribution does not have an increasing density as is predicted bv the model with identical agents. Allowing for heterogeneity in p may improve the fit to the observed wage offer and earnings distribution. To see this we consider the following transformation of w (note that we acknowledge the dependence of the support of w on P) (P) so that the excess wage w --1) (p) satisfies
uYiLL(P) = (I-Y)(P-ICC(P))
q2 < y < 1. 
-a(p) is a fraction of the excess productivity p -u(p).
This fraction is a random variable with a distribution that depends on X,/6, which is the expected number of wage offers during a spell of employment (i.e. a spell that starts with the acceptance of a job from unemployment and ends with a lavoff). This ratio is a measure of the speed at which the worker climbs the job (and wage) ladder, with y = 1 corresponding to the bottom, w = u&), and y = q2 to the top, w = c(p)? of this ladder. From (11) it follows that the moments of w -u(p) in either the wage offer or the earnings distribution are the product of (p --(p) )~ and a11 expression that onlv depends on 7. Bv choosing d " an appropriate distribution of the productivitv p, the moments of the observed wage offer or earnings distribution can be matched. Hence, we expect that an acceptable fit to the data depends on the allowance for sufficient heterogeneity in p. This is confirmed in Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) .
The data
The model is estimated with the 0% ( In the OSA panel a random sample of households in the Netherlands is followed over time. Because the study concentrates on individuals who are between 15 and 61 years of age and who are not full-time students, only households with at least one person in this categorv are included. All individuals (and in all cases the head of the household) in this'categorv are interviewed. The first wave consists of 4020 individuals (in 2132 households).
The data allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of labor market states occupied bv the respondents and the sojourn times and income levels in these states. Part of the information is retrospective. For example, the first wave (in 1985) contains information on the labor market histories from January 1, 1980 until the date of the interview. The following labor market positions are distinguished: employment (job-to-job changes are recorded), self-employment, unemployment, and not-in-labor-force (subdivided into military service, full-time education, and other activities not related to the labor market).
In this paper we restrict attention to respondents who were participating in the panel as of the first wave. Individuals who were self-employed at certain dates of the time span covered by the survey were deleted, since it is likelv that the behavior of such individuals? at least in a certain period, deviates substantially from the behavior as described by the model. For similar reasons, we do not use information on respondents who.are observed to be nonparticipant in the labor market at certain dates. Finally, we delete observations for which the reported wage is smaller than the legal minimum wage.3
As a result. we ha,ve a sample of li'67 individuals. Of these, 12% were unemploved at the date of the first, interview.
k . In our sample, 34% participate in all four waves of the panel, while 33% onlv participate in the first wave. The income changes at transit'ions occurring before: the date of the first interview (April 1985) are only recorded to lie in one of a fe\v broad intervals. This makes the information on spells ending before this date relatively inaccurate in comparison to spells ending after it. For the latter spells we observe exact income levels. Therefore, the first spell used is the spell which is in progress at the date of the first interview. For computational reasons, information on subsequent spells is not used either.
The benefits level b is taken to be t$he average in the subsample. The mandatorv minimum wage w c L equals 1000 Dutch guilders (monthly) for respondents vounger than 23 vears of age. and 1450 Dutch guilders for older respondents. In " "An alternative way to deal with this problem is to assume that wages are measured with clrror: see Van den Be& and Ridder (1998).
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t,he overall sample, wL is taken to be the average in the sample.
The likelihood function
If we only allow for heterogeneity in p, t/hen the parameters of the model are X,, A,, 6 and the parameters of the distribution of p. We estimate these parameters from observed labor market histories of a sample of individuals. These labor market histories are recorded with the observation plan of Section 3. In this observation plan a random sample from all individuals in a particular age bracket, who were either employed or unemploved in May 1985, was drawn. The individuals in the sample were followed until either their first transition from the state occupied in May 1985 or the end of t.he observation period, i.e. November 1990. Their labor market history from January 1, 1980 onward was also reconstructed. Hence the individuals in the sample can be followed backward in time starting in May 1985. In the observation plan they are followed until either their first transition from the state occupied in May 1985 or the end of the observation period, i.e. January 1, 1980. For the younger age groups we observe many transitions from (un)emplovment to full-time education or, for the men, militarv service. The u corresponding unemplovment or job spells are treated as censored spells.
In its simplest form. the model has no observed explanatory variables, and the dependent variables' are aspects of the individual labor market histories. To be specific, the dependent variables include the labor market position (employed or unemploved) at the date of the first interview and the elapsed and residual duration in that position. If an unemploved individual finds a job before the " end of the observation period. we observe the re-employment wage wO. Further? we observe the wages of employed individuals at the time of the first interview, 'a:1 : and, if the job spell of this individual ends before the observation period, the tvpe of transition at the end of this spell. This is either a transition into unemplovment? or into another job.
The derivation of the joint distribution of the observed variables is in two st'eps. First, we derive the joint distribution conditional on a particular value of 1). Next, we integrate with respect to p to obtain the joint distribution of the observable variables. Below, we merely list the distributions of some of the main ingredients of the likelihood function. See Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) for more details.
For a given value of p > max(b, u:~ ), the emplovment and job durations are -J c txponentiallv distributed. Following Ridder (1984)) this implies that the corresponding elapsed and residual durations are independent and also exponentiallv r/ distributed. If p < b, there is no gain from trade, and if p < wL, the minimum wage is too high to employ the workers. In both cases the workers are permanently unemployed. If p > max(b, wL), then an individual is frictionally unemployed with probability a/@ + A,). In our data we have wL > b. Hence the structural unemployment rate us q e uals H(w,J. The unconditional probability that an individual is unemployed at the time of the first interview equals (12)
In the sequel, we assume that the censoring times for the elapsed and residual unemployment durations are stochastically independent of the corresponding durations, i. e. we assume that censoring is independent. For the unemployed the joint conditional distribution of the elapsed and residual unemployment durations is degenerate if p < wL. In that case the elapsed and residual unemployment durations are both infinite, hence the observed durations are censored. Because the observation period is at most 129 months, we never observe the elapsed and residual unemployment durations to be infinite, but if they are both censored we allow for this possibilitv. Given the length of the observation period, we consider this to be a reasonable assumption. If p > w -L, the elapsed and residual unemployment durations at the time of the first interview are independently and exponentially distributed with parameter A,. Note that these durations can be censored as well.
The conditional distribution of the accepted wage from unemployment w. is onlv defined if p > wL. c -We denote this conditional p.d.f. by f(w,lp), with f as in (7). Note that w(p) and BT(P) are as in equations (5) and (8) .
If the individual is emploved at the date of the first interview b , the conditional distributions are onlv defined if p > wL.
The densitv function of wages of emploved individuals at the time of the first interview conditional on p is denoted h I&q IP) 7 c with g as in (9): again with w(p) and a(p) as in (5) and (8). Further, the elapsed and residual job duration at the time of the first interview are independently exponentially distributed with parameter 6 + X,F(w, Ip). Note that this hazard rate out of the job is conditional on p. A subsequent transition to a higher paving job has probability " c and the complement of this is the probability of a transition into unemployment. The individual likelihood contribution is the joint distribution of the observAes, which is obtained bv integrat!ion with respect to the distribution of p. The "
